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Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in an interacting particle system with two types.
The model we investigate is an extension of a two-type biased voter model. One type
(called defector) has a (positive) bias α with respect to the other type (called cooperator).
However, a cooperator helps a neighbor (either defector or cooperator) to reproduce at
rate γ. We prove that the one-dimensional nearest-neighbor interacting dynamical system
exhibits a phase transition at α = γ. A special choice of interaction kernels yield that for
α > γ cooperators always die out, but if γ > α, cooperation is the winning strategy.
Keywords: Interacting particle system; voter model; cooperation; phase transition; extinction;
survival; clustering
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1 Introduction
In nature cooperative behavior amongst individuals is widely spread. It is observed in ani-
mals, e.g. [Clu09, GW03], as well as in microorganisms, e.g. [Cre01, WL06]. In the attempt
to understand this phenomenon by models, theoretical approaches introduced different inter-
pretations and forms of cooperation, mostly within the area of game theory [Now06]. In all
such approaches, a defector (or selfish) type tends to have more offspring, but there are cases
when it is outcompeted by the cooperator type under some circumstances. Although in all
of the models describing cooperation the question of extinction and survival of a type or the
coexistence of several types are main subjects of the mathematical analysis, the frameworks
for the theoretical studies may vary. While (stochastic) differential equations are mainly used
for non-spatial systems (see for example [AS12, HJM15+]), the theory of interacting particle
systems provides a suitable setup for the analysis of models with local interactions between
the particles, [BK11, EL16, SS15]. In this paper we define a model using the latter structure
and terminology.
Investigations of models incorporating cooperation are interesting because of the following
dichotomy: in non-spatial (well-mixed) situations, the whole population benefits from the
cooperative behavior. If defectors have a higher fitness than cooperators, defectors always
outcompete cooperators in the long run. However, if the system is truly spatial, cooperators
can form clusters and then use their cooperative behavior in order to defend themselves
against defectors, even though those might have higher (individual) fitness. This heuristics
suggests that only structured models can help to understand cooperative behavior in nature.
For the model studied in the present paper, we will make it precise in Proposition 2.6 for
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extinction of cooperators in a non-spatial system and in Theorem 1 for extinction of defectors
in a spatial system, if cooperation is strong enough.
Due to the variety of interpretations of cooperative behavior there are different ways
of implementing these mechanisms in a spatial context. In the field of population dynam-
ics, Sturm and Swart [SS15] study an interacting particle system containing a cooperative-
branching mechanism which can be understood as a sexual reproduction event. In [BK11],
Blath and Kurt study a branching-annihilating random walk and again, a cooperation mech-
anism is interpreted as sexual reproduction. In contrast, the model introduced by Evilsizor
and Lanchier in [EL16] originates from the game-theoretical study of a two player game with
different strategies where the strategies can be altruistic or selfish. Here, the altruistic strate-
gies represent the cooperator type. We discuss the findings of these models to our results in
Section 4.
Various interacting particle systems which appear in the literature are attractive, i.e. two
versions of the system, which start in configurations where one dominates the other, can be
coupled such that this property holds for all times; see e.g. [SS15] for an attractive model
mentioned above. For such processes, there exist several general results (cf. [Lig85]) which
provide some useful techniques helping in the analysis. However, cooperation often leads to
non-attractive interacting particle systems; see [BK11, EL16] and the one presented here.
The reason here is that cooperators (or altruists) do not distinguish between non-cooperators
and their own type which usually contradicts attractiveness.
The motivation for the present paper came from studies of bacterial cells in the context
of public-good-dilemmas, e.g. [BBRG08, DNSWB14]. The idea is that there are two types
(defector=0, cooperator=1), where only cooperators produce some public good which helps
neighboring cells to reproduce. However, this production is costly which means that defectors
will have a selective advantage over the cooperator type. The resulting model is a biased voter
model with an additional cooperation mechanism. The main objective of our paper is to study
the long-time behavior of such a model dependent on the parameters of the system.
In particular, we prove for our main model in one dimension from Definition 2.5.3, that the
system clusters independently of the parameter configuration. When starting in a translation
invariant configuration, for α > γ, defectors take over the population, whereas for γ > α
cooperators win; see Theorem 1. Additionally, in higher dimensions, at least we can show that
the parameter region where defecting particles win is larger than for d = 1; see Theorem 2.
We also show that a finite number of cooperators dies out if α > γ, but may survive if
γ > α. The converse holds true for defectors; see Theorem 3. What remains to be seen is if
there are parameter combinations such that cooperators win also in higher dimensions. Some
preliminary results in the limit of small parameters α and γ or very large γ can be found in
[Czu16].
The paper is structured as follows. First, we give a general definition of the model in
Section 2. After the definition we derive some properties of the model, show its existence and
consider some special cases and related systems. In Section 3 we state limit results for the main
model and its derivatives, mainly restricted to the one-dimensional lattice. Subsequently, in
Section 4, we compare our results with those obtained in similar models, e.g. from [BK11]
and [EL16]. The rest of the paper is devoted to the proofs of the theorems.
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2 The model and first results
2.1 The model
Let V be a countable vertex set, and (a(u, v))u,v∈V be a (not necessarily symmetric) Markov
kernel from V to V . Additionally, (b(u, (v, w))u∈V,(v,w)∈V×V is a second Markov kernel from
V to V × V . We study an interacting particle system X = ((Xt(u))u∈V )t≥0 with state space
{0, 1}V , where Xt(u) ∈ {0, 1} is the type at site u at time t. A particle in state 0 is called
defector and a particle in state 1 is called cooperator. The dynamics of the interacting particle
system, which is a Markov process, is (informally) as follows: For some α, γ ≥ 0:
• Reproduction: A particle at site u ∈ V reproduces with rate a(u, v) to site v, i.e. X(v)
changes to X(u). (This mechanism is well-known from the voter model.)
• Selection: If X(u) = 0 (i.e. there is a defector at site u ∈ V ), it reproduces with
additional rate α a(u, v) to site v, i.e. X(v) changes to 0. (A defector has a fitness
advantage over the cooperators by this additional chance to reproduce. This mechanism
is well-known from the biased voter model.)
• Cooperation: If X(u) = 1 (i.e. there is a cooperator at site u ∈ V ), the individual at
site v (no matter which state it has) reproduces to site w at rate γ b(u, (v, w)) ≥ 0. (A
cooperator at site u helps an individual at site v to reproduce to site w.)
Remark 2.1 (Interpretation). 1. Selection: Since cooperation imposes an energetic cost
on cooperators, the non-cooperating individuals can use these free resources for re-
production processes. This leads to a fitness advantage which we describe with the
parameter α.
2. Cooperation: The idea of the cooperation mechanism in our model is that each coopera-
tor supports a neighboring individual, independent of its type, to reproduce to another
site according to the Markov kernel b. A biological interpretation for this supportive
interaction is a common good produced by cooperators and released to the environment
helping the colony to expand. The corresponding interaction parameter is γ.
Below, we will deal with two situations, depending on whether b(u, (v, u)) > 0 or
b(u, (v, u)) = 0. In the former case, we speak of an altruistic system, since a coop-
erator at site u can help the particle at site v to kill it. In the latter case, we speak of
a cooperative system.
In order to uniquely define a Markov process, we will need the following assumption.
Assumption 2.2 (Markov kernels). The Markov kernels a(., .) and b(., (., .)) satisfy∑
u∈V
a(u, v) <∞ for all v ∈ V (2.1)
and ∑
u,v∈V
b(u, (v, w)) <∞ for all w ∈ V. (2.2)
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Remark 2.3 (Some special cases). A special case is
b(u, (v, w)) = a(u, v) · a(v, w) for all u, v, w ∈ V. (2.3)
Then, (2.2) is implied by the assumption
sup
v∈V
∑
u∈V
a(u, v) <∞,
which is stronger than (2.1). We will also deal with a similar case setting b(u, (v, u)) = 0
which means that u cannot help v to replace u. To be more precise, we set
b(u, (v, w)) =
{
a(u, v) · a(v,w)1{w 6=u}∑
w′ 6=u a(v,w′)
, if a(v, u) < 1,
0, else,
for all u, v, w ∈ V. (2.4)
The normalizing sum in the denominator emerges from the exclusion of self-replacement, i.e.
(2.4) is the two-step transition kernel of a self-avoiding random walk.
2.2 Existence and uniqueness of the process
We now become more formal and define the (pre-)generator of the process X via its transition
rates. Given X ∈ {0, 1}V , the rate of change c(u,X) from X to
Xu(v) =
{
X(v), v ∈ V \{u};
1−X(u), v = u;
is as follows:
If X(u) = 0, then
c(u,X) =
∑
v
a(v, u)X(v) + γ
∑
v
X(v)
∑
w
X(w)b(w, (v, u)). (2.5)
If X(u) = 1, then
c(u,X) = (1 + α)
∑
v
a(v, u)(1−X(v)) + γ
∑
v
(1−X(v))
∑
w
X(w)b(w, (v, u)). (2.6)
Here, the first sum in c(u,X) represents the rates triggered by reproduction and selection
whereas the last terms emerge from the cooperation mechanism.
The existence of a unique Markov process corresponding to the transition rates c(u,X)
satisfying Assumption 2.2 is guaranteed by standard theory, see for example [Lig85, Chapter
1]. Precisely, we define the (pre-)generator Ω of the process through
(Ωf)(X) =
∑
u∈G
c(u,X)(f(Xu)− f(X)),
where f ∈ D(Ω), the domain of Ω, is given by
D(Ω) := {f : {0, 1}V → R depends only on finitely many coordinates}.
We note that D(Ω) is dense in Cb({0, 1}V ), the set of bounded continuous functions on {0, 1}V ,
because of the Stone-Weierstrass-Theorem. We find the following general statement.
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Proposition 2.4 (Existence of unique Markov process). If Assumption 2.2 holds, the tran-
sition rates c(., .) given in (2.5) and (2.6) define a unique Markov process X on {0, 1}V .
Moreover, the closure Ω¯ of Ω is the generator of X.
Proof. We need to show that the closure of Ω in C({0, 1}V ) is a generator of a semi-group
which then uniquely defines a Markov process (see for example [Lig85, Theorem 1.1.5]). In
order to show this we follow [Lig85, Theorem 1.3.9] and check the following two conditions:
sup
u∈V
sup
X∈{0,1}V
c(u,X) <∞, (2.7)
sup
u∈V
∑
v 6=u
c˜u(v) <∞, (2.8)
where
c˜u(v) := sup{‖c(u,X1)− c(u,X2)‖T : X1(w) = X2(w) for all w 6= v}
measures the dependence of the transition rate c(u,X) of the site v ∈ V and ‖ · ‖T denotes
the total variation norm.
Both inequalities follow from Assumption 2.2 and the definition of the transition rates
c(., .). Using these we obtain for any X ∈ {0, 1}V and u ∈ V
c(u,X) ≤ (1 + α)
∑
v∈V
a(v, u) + γ
∑
v,w∈V
b(w, (v, u)) <∞
showing (2.7). For (2.8), we note that c˜u(v) 6= 0 only when either a(v, u) > 0 or b(w, (v, u)) > 0
or b(v, (w, u)) > 0 for some w ∈ V . Hence, for all u ∈ V we obtain
∑
v 6=u
c˜u(v) ≤
∑
v 6=u
(
(1 + α)a(v, u) + γ
∑
w∈V
b(w, (v, u)) + b(v, (w, u))
)
≤
∑
v∈V
(1 + α)a(v, u) + 2γ
∑
v,w∈V
b(v, (w, u)) <∞,
where we used the inequalities (2.1) and (2.2) again and we have proved (2.8).
Now, using [Lig85, Theorem 1.3.9] we see that the closure of Ω in C({0, 1}V ) is a Markov
generator of a Markov semigroup. This finishes the proof.
We can now define the voter model with bias and cooperation.
Definition 2.5 ((Cooperative/Altruistic) Voter Model with Bias and Cooperation). Let a(., .)
be a Markov kernel from V to V satisfying (2.1) and b(., (., .)) be a Markov kernel from V to
V × V satisfying (2.2).
1. The (unique) Markov process with transition rates given by (2.5) and (2.6) is called the
Voter Model with Bias and Cooperation (VMBC).
2. If (2.3) holds, the VMBC is called the altruistic Voter Model with Bias and Cooperation
(aVMBC).
3. If (2.4) holds, the VMBC is called the cooperative Voter Model with Bias and Cooper-
ation (cVMBC).
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2.3 Unstructured populations
As a first result, we show that the probability for cooperators to die out on a large, complete
graph tends to one (for α > 0). We consider the special case of an unstructured population.
Therefore, let V N be the vertex set of a graph with |V N | = N and
aN (u, v) =
1
N − 1
for u, v ∈ V N with u 6= v. Due to the global neighborhood it is equally likely to find
configurations of the form ”101” and ”110”. Hence, cooperation events favoring a defector or
a cooperator happen with the same rate and thus cancel out when looking at the mean field
behavior of the system. We will show that defectors always take over the system for large
N . It can easily be seen that the aVMBC is dominated by the cVMBC, so it suffices to show
extinction of cooperators for the cVMBC, i.e. we have
bN (u, (v, w)) =
1{u6=v}
N − 1
1{v 6=w}1{w 6=u}
(N − 1)N−2N−1
=
1
(N − 1)(N − 2)1{u,v,w different}.
We prove that in the limit for large N the frequency of cooperators follows a logistic equation
with negative drift, hence cooperators die out. See also [EK86, Chapter 11].
Proposition 2.6 (Convergence in the unstructured case). Let XN be a cVMBC on V N and
SN := 1N
∑
uX
N (u) the frequency of cooperators. Then, if SN0
N→∞
====⇒ s0, then
SN
N→∞
====⇒ S,
where S solves the ODE
dS = −αS(1− S)
with S0 = s0, independently of γ.
Proof. In order to prove the limiting behavior for N → ∞, we observe that SN is a Markov
process. A calculation of the generator ΩN applied to some smooth function f yields
ΩNf(s) = Ns
1− s
1− 1N
(f(s+ 1N )− f(s)) + (1 + α)N(1− s)
s
1− 1N
(f(s− 1N )− f(s))
+ γNs
s− 1N
1− 1N
1− s
1− 2N
(f(s+ 1N )− f(s))
+ γNs
1− s
1− 1N
s− 1N
1− 2N
(f(s− 1N )− f(s))
N→∞−−−−→ −αs(1− s)f ′(s).
Applying standard weak convergence results, see for example [EK86, Theorem 4.8.2], this
shows the claimed convergence.
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3 Results on the long-time behavior for V = Zd
Our main goal is to derive the long-time behavior of the VMBC with V = Zd. In spin-flip
systems, results on the ergodic behavior can be obtained by general principles if the process is
attractive. Thereby, a spin-system is called attractive if for two configurations X,Y ∈ {0, 1}V
with X ≤ Y componentwise, the corresponding transition rates c satisfy the following two
relations for all u ∈ V
X(u) = Y (u) = 0⇒ c(u,X) ≤ c(u, Y ), (3.1)
X(u) = Y (u) = 1⇒ c(u,X) ≥ c(u, Y ). (3.2)
However, the VMBC is not attractive for γ > 0. Indeed, consider the simple case when
V = {u, v, w} with Markov kernels
a(u, v) = a(v, w) = a(w, u) = 1
and b(u, (v, w)) = a(u, v)a(v, w). Then, let X = (001) and Y = (101) (i.e. X(u) = 0, Y (u) =
1, X(v) = Y (v) = 0, X(w) = Y (w) = 1) and note that X ≤ Y , but
c(w,X) = 1 + α < 1 + α+ γ = c(w, Y ).
This shows that (3.2) is not satisfied at w ∈ V . Hence, proofs for the long-time behavior
require other strategies which do not rely on attractiveness of the process.
Before we state our main results we define what we mean by extinction and clustering.
Definition 3.1 (Extinction, clustering). 1. We say that in the VMBC-process (Xt)t≥0
type i ∈ {0, 1} dies out if
P
(
lim
t→∞Xt(u) = 1− i
)
= 1, for all u ∈ V.
2. We say that the VMBC-process clusters if for all u, v ∈ V
lim
t→∞P (Xt(u) = Xt(v)) = 1.
We will use V = Zd and nearest neighbor interaction via the kernels a and b. In this case we
have that for all u, v, w ∈ Zd with |u− v| = |w − v| = 1
a(u, v) =
1
2d
, b(u, (v, w)) =
1
(2d)2
(3.3)
for the aVMBC and
a(u, v) =
1
2d
, b(u, (v, w)) =
1
2d(2d− 1)1{u6=w} (3.4)
for the cVMBC. We say that (the distribution of) a {0, 1}Zd-valued random configuration X is
non-trivial if P (X(u) = 0 for all u), P (X(u) = 1 for all u) < 1. Furthermore, we callX trans-
lation invariant if (X(u1), ..., X(un))
d
= (X(u1 + v), ..., X(un + v)) for all n ∈ N, u1, ..., un, v ∈
Zd. If the VMBC model is started in a translation invariant configuration X0 ∈ {0, 1}Zd , the
configuration Xt is translation invariant due to the homogeneous model dynamics.
Now we can state our main results. For cVMBC, we distinguish between the case α > γ
where we can state a convergence result in all dimensions d ≥ 1, the case γ > α and the case
γ = α. In the last two cases, the method of proof is only applicable in dimension d = 1.
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Figure 1: Relative frequencies of cooperators after 100, 000 transitions of the cVMBC on a
1, 000 sites torus in one dimension (dashed line), a 40×40 sites torus in two dimensions (solid
line) and a 12×12×12 sites torus in three dimensions (dotted line). The initial configuration
was a Bernoulli-product measure with probability 0.5 and the selection rate α was set to 0.5.
We suspect that the slightly smaller slope in three dimensions is a finite-number effect.
Theorem 1 (cVMBC-limits). Let V = Zd and a(., .) be the nearest neighbor random walk
kernel and X be the cVMBC with α, γ ≥ 0 starting in some non-trivial translation invariant
configuration.
(i) If d ≥ 1 and α > γ, the cooperators die out.
(ii) If d = 1 and γ > α, the defectors die out.
(iii) If d = 1 and γ = α, the process clusters.
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Section 6.1. Briefly, for α > γ, we will use a
comparison argument with a biased voter model, see Definition 5.1. For γ > α and d = 1,
however, we prove the convergence result with the help of a clustersize-process which takes
the special form of a one-dimensional jump process. As we will see, for γ > α, a cluster of
cooperators has a positive probability to survive and expand to infinity which will then yield
the result. Unfortunately, due to the simple description of such a cluster in one dimension, this
argument cannot be extended to higher dimensions. However, resorting to some simulation
results for d = 2 and d = 3, we see a similar behavior (with a different threshold) like in d = 1,
see Figure 1. For higher dimensions, spatial correlations between sites are weaker reducing
the impact of clusters on the evolution of the system. This in turn leads to a reduced chance
of survival of cooperators.
For the aVMBC, we can only state a threshold when cooperators die out.
Theorem 2 (aVMBC-limits). Let V = Zd and a(., .) be the nearest neighbor random walk
kernel and X be the aVMBC with α, γ ≥ 0 starting in some non-trivial translation invariant
configuration.
(i) If d ≥ 1 and α > γ d−1d , the cooperators die out. In particular, for d = 1, the cooperators
die out if α > 0 independently of γ.
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(ii) If d = 1, the process equals the cVMBC with parameters α+γ/2 and γ/2 in distribution.
In particular, if γ > α = 0, the process clusters.
The proof of the Theorem can be found in Section 6.2. Again, for α > γ(d − 1)/d, we
can use a comparison argument with the biased voter model. However, it remains an open
question whether cooperators in the aVMBC have a positive probability of survival in any
dimension. On the one hand, the difference between the aVMBC and the cVMBC becomes
smaller in high dimensions suggesting survival of cooperators for large γ. On the other hand,
clustering is usually more difficult in higher dimensions but cooperators can only survive due
to clustering. First simulation results for d = 2 and d = 3 show that survival of cooperators
is unlikely in the aVMBC.
Remark 3.2 (Cooperation only among cooperators). Another cooperation mechanism we
might consider arises if cooperators only help other cooperators, i.e. the cells recognize related
cells. In ecological literature this behavior is called kin-recognition or kin-discrimination, see
[PF10] for an overview. As to the theoretical behavior of the model this changes the transition
rate in (2.6), i.e. if X(u) = 1 then
c(u,X) = (1 + α)
∑
v
a(v, u)(1−X(v)).
Here, cooperators are less likely to die and hence, this process dominates the cVMBC. In
particular, for translation invariant initial conditions, defectors die out for γ > α in one
dimension. Moreover, as can be seen from a calculation similar as in the proof of Lemma 5.3,
a biased voter model, where type 0 is favored, still dominates this process for α > γ. Hence,
we also have that cooperators die out in this case and the same results as in Theorem 1 hold.
Since cooperators always die out in d = 1 for the aVMBC (as long as α > 0), we focus on
the cVMBC in the sequel. We state some results if the starting configuration is not translation
invariant, but contains only a finite number of cooperators or defectors.
Theorem 3 (Finite initial configurations). Let V = Z and a(., .) be the nearest neighbor
random walk kernel and X be the cVMBC with α, γ ≥ 0. Let X0 contain either finitely many
defectors or finitely many cooperators (i.e. X0 = 1A or X0 = 1− 1A for some finite A ⊆ V ).
(i) The process clusters.
(ii) If α ≥ γ and X0 contains finitely many cooperators, the cooperators die out.
(iii) If γ ≥ α and X0 contains finitely many defectors, the defectors die out.
Remark 3.3 (Starting with a single particle). A particularly simple initial condition is given
if |A| = 1. In case there is initially only a single cooperator, we note that the size of the
cluster of cooperators (Ct)t≥0 is a birth-death process which jumps from C to
C + 1 at rate 1{C>0} + γ · 1{C≥2},
C − 1 at rate (1 + α) · 1{C>0}.
Conversely, if there is only a single defector, the size of the cluster of defectors (Dt)t≥0 is a
birth-death process which jumps from D to
D + 1 at rate (1 + α) · 1{D>0} + γ · 1{D=1},
D − 1 at rate (1 + γ) · 1{D>0}.
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Hence, either cooperators or defectors die out, depending on whether (Ct)t≥0 (or (Dt)t≥0)
hits 0 or not.
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Section 6.3. Note that the only situations where the
process does not converge to a deterministic configuration in this setting are the cases where
γ > α (α > γ) and the process starts with finitely many cooperators (defectors). Here, the
limit distribution is a linear combination of the invariant measures δ0 and δ1, the all-zero and
all-one configuration, respectively. This basically means that we observe clustering, which is
statement (i) above.
4 Comparison to results from [BK11] and [EL16]
In this section we compare our results on the cVMBC to those obtained by Blath and Kurt in
[BK11] and the system introduced by Evilsizor and Lanchier in [EL16]. We choose these two
models since both have mechanisms favoring one type, while a second type is only favored if
it occurs in a cluster.
Comparison to [BK11]
One model studied is the cooperative caring double-branching annihilating random walk (ccD-
BARW) on the integer lattice Z. Particles migrate to neighboring sites with rate m and
annihilate when meeting another particle. (Note that this mechanism favors the unoccupied
state.) The double-branching events happen with rate 1 − m. Here, the authors restrict
branching to particles with an occupied neighboring site and such particles branch to the
next unoccupied site to the left and to the right. (That is, if a cluster of size ≥ 2 already ex-
ists, the branching mechanism extends the cluster.) Their result about this process, starting
in a finite configuration (see Theorem 2.4 in the paper), states that for m < 1/2, particles
survive with positive probability, whereas for m > 2/3, particles die out almost surely.
Although Blath and Kurt only discuss the case of a finite initial configuration, the results
are in line with our findings: If the mechanism to favor enlargement of existing clusters
(cooperation in our case and cooperative branching in their case) is too weak, type 0 (or the
unoccupied state) wins. Importantly, in both models, enlargement of existing clusters can be
strong enough in order to outcompete the beneficial (or unoccupied) type.
Comparison to [EL16]
The model studied in [EL16] – called the death-birth updating process – emerges from a game
theoretic model with two strategies. This means that transition rates are derived from a 2×2
payoff-matrix with entries aij for i, j ∈ {1, 2} representing the payoff obtained by a particle
of type i due to interacting with a particle of type j. Now, a particle dies with rate 1 and is
replaced by a particle in its neighborhood proportionally to its fitness which is determined by
the values of the payoff-matrix. The neighborhood is given by blocks of radius R. The authors
analyze this model in different settings. They call a strategy i selfish if aii > aji for j 6= i (i.e.
the payoff having strategy i as opponent is bigger if one has the same strategy i) and altruistic
if aii < aji. Again, in a non-spatial version of this game, selfish strategies always outcompete
altruistic strategies. Noting that selfish strategies seem to be fitter, altruistic strategies might
become favorable if they form a big cluster because altruists might have a high payoff. As
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the results in [EL16] show (see their Figure 2), there are parameter regions – in particular in
a spatial Prisoner’s dilemma – where altruists can outcompete selfish strategies.
Clearly, the cVMBC is a much simpler model than the death-birth updating process. This
is resembled in the results, since [EL16] show parameter combinations with coexistence for
the death-birth updating process, but our results never show coexistence for the cVMBC.
However, as in our findings for the cVMBC, [EL16] find that types unfavorable in a non-
spatial context can indeed win in all dimensions. Unfortunately, they can only give bounds
on the phase transition in their model, while we have seen that α = γ is a sharp threshold,
at least in one dimension.
5 Preliminaries
Here we provide some useful results for the proofs of our theorems. In particular, we provide
a comparison with a biased voter model in Section 5.1 and a particular jump process in
Section 5.2.
5.1 Comparison results
In cases where α > γ, it is possible to prove a stochastic domination of the VMBC by a biased
voter model. The precise statements will be given below. But first, we define this process,
which was introduced by Williams and Bjerknes in [WB71] and first studied by Bramson and
Griffeath in [BG81].
Definition 5.1 (Biased Voter Model). The biased voter model with bias β ≥ −1 and δ ≥ −1
is a spin system X˜ with state space {0, 1}V and transition rates as follows:
If X˜(u) = 0, then
c˜(u, X˜) = (1 + β)
∑
v
a(v, u)X(v).
If X˜(u) = 1, then
c˜(u, X˜) = (1 + δ)
∑
v
a(v, u)(1−X(v))
Remark 5.2 (Long-time behavior of the biased voter model). The long-time behavior of
the biased voter model is quite simple. In [BG81], the limit behavior of the biased voter
model in V = Zd with nearest neighbor interactions is studied. Generalizations to the case
of d−regular trees for d ≥ 3 can be found in [LTV14]. We restate the results for V = Zd:
Let X˜ be a biased voter model with bias β > −1 and δ > −1 as introduced in Definition 5.1.
For any configuration X0 ∈ {0, 1}Zd with infinitely particles of each type it holds that the
type with less bias dies out, i.e.:
1. If β > δ, type 0 dies out (i.e. P (limt→∞ X˜t(u) = 1) = 1 for all u ∈ V ).
2. If δ > β, type 1 dies out (i.e. P (limt→∞ X˜t(u) = 0) = 1 for all u ∈ V ).
Lemma 5.3 (cVMBC≤biased voter model). Let X be a cVMBC with bias α and cooperation
coefficient γ and X˜ a biased voter model with bias γ and α. Then, if b(., (., .)) satisfies∑
u b(u, (v, w)) ≤ a(v, w), and X0 ≤ X˜0, it is possible to couple X and X˜ such that Xt ≤ X˜t
for all t ≥ 0.
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Proof. We need to show (see [Lig85, Theorem 3.1.5]) that for X ≤ X˜
if X(u) = X˜(u) = 0, then c(u,X) ≤ c˜(u, X˜),
if X(u) = X˜(u) = 1, then c(x,X) ≥ c˜(u, X˜).
(5.1)
We start with the first assertion and write
c(u,X) =
∑
v
a(v, u)X(v) + γ
∑
v
X(v)
∑
w
X(w)b(w, (v, u))
≤
∑
v
a(v, u)X(v) + γ
∑
v
X(v)a(v, u)
≤ (1 + γ)
∑
v
a(v, u)X˜(v) = c˜(u, X˜),
and for the second inequality we have
c(u,X) = (1 + α)
∑
v
a(v, u)(1−X(v)) + γ
∑
v
(1−X(v))
∑
w,v
X(w)b(w, (v, u))
≥ (1 + α)
∑
v
a(v, u)(1−X(v)) ≥ (1 + α)
∑
v
a(v, u)(1− X˜(v)) = c˜(u, X˜).
This finishes the proof.
Next, we focus on the aVMBC in the case V = Zd and the symmetric, nearest-neighbor
random walk kernel.
Lemma 5.4 (aVMBC≤biased voter model). Let V = Zd, a(., .) be the nearest-neighbor
random walk kernel defined in equation (3.3), X be an aVMBC with bias α and cooperation
coefficient γ and X˜ a biased voter model with bias γ(2d − 1)/(2d) and α + γ/(2d). Then, if
X0 ≤ X˜0, it is possible to couple X and X˜ such that Xt ≤ X˜t for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. Again, we need to show that for X ≤ X˜ the inequalities in (5.1) hold. We start with
the first assertion and write by using that X(u) = 0
c(u,X) =
∑
v
a(v, u)X(v) + γ
∑
v
X(v)
∑
w
X(w)a(v, w)a(v, u)
≤
∑
v
a(v, u)X(v) + γ
∑
v
X(v)a(v, u)
∑
w 6=u
a(v, w)
≤
(
1 + γ
2d− 1
2d
)∑
v
a(v, u)X˜(v) = c˜(u, X˜),
and for the second inequality, now using X(u) = 1 we have
c(u,X) = (1 + α)
∑
v
a(v, u)(1−X(v)) + γ
∑
v
(1−X(v))
∑
w
X(w)a(w, v)a(v, u)
≥ (1 + α)
∑
v
a(v, u)(1−X(v)) + γ
∑
v
(1−X(v))a(u, v)a(v, u)
=
(
1 + α+
γ
2d
)∑
v
a(v, u)(1−X(v))
≥
(
1 + α+
γ
2d
)∑
v
a(v, u)(1− X˜(v)) = c˜(u, X˜).
This yields the statement.
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5.2 A result on a jump process
In the proof of Theorem 1, we will use the dynamics of the size of a cluster of cooperators
and rely on a comparison of this clustersize process with a certain jump process (which jumps
downward by at most one and upwards by at most two). The following Proposition will be
needed.
Proposition 5.5 (A jump process). Let (µ(t))t≥0, (λ1(t))t≥0, (λ2(t))t≥0 be R+-valued ca`dla`g-
stochastic processes, adapted to some filtration (Ft)t≥0, which satisfy
λ1(t) + 2λ2(t)− µ(t) > ε > 0 for some ε and
λ1(t) + λ2(t) + µ(t) < C for some C > 0.
(5.2)
In addition, let (Ct)t≥0 be a Z-valued (Ft)t≥0-Markov-jump-process, which jumps at time t
from x to
x− 1 at rate µ(t),
x+ 1 at rate λ1(t),
x+ 2 at rate λ2(t)
Then,
1. Ct
t→∞−−−→∞ almost surely and
2. P (T1 =∞) > 0, for C0 = 2 and T1 := inf{t : Ct = 1}.
Proof. In the case of time-homogeneous rates, i.e. constant µ, λ1 and λ2, the assertion is an
immediate consequence of the law of large numbers. We prove the general case by using
martingale theory. We assume without loss of generality that λ1(t) + λ2(t) + µ(t) = 1 for
all t ≥ 0. (Otherwise, we use a time-rescaling. Note that this rescaling is bounded by
assumption (5.2) and therefore, Ct
t→∞−−−→∞ holds iff it holds for the rescaled process.)
We first show that there exists ac > 0 such that for all a ∈ (0, ac), the process (exp(−aCt))t≥0
is a positive (Ft)t≥0-super-martingale. For this, consider the (time-dependent) generator of
the process (Ct)t≥0 applied to the function f(x) = exp(−ax) which yields at time t
(GCt f)(x) = λ1(t) exp(−a(x+ 1)) + λ2(t) exp(−a(x+ 2))
+ µ(t) exp(−a(x− 1))− exp(−ax)
= exp(−ax)(λ1(t) exp(−a) + λ2(t) exp(−2a) + µ(t) exp(a)− 1)
= exp(−ax)gt(a)
for gt(a) := λ1(t) exp(−a) + λ2(t) exp(−2a) + µ(t) exp(a) − 1. Noting that for all t, we have
that gt(0) = 0 and
∂gt
∂a
(0) = −λ1(t)− 2λ2(t) + µ(t) < −ε
by (5.2), we find ac > 0 such that gt(a) < 0 for all 0 < a < ac and all t ≥ 0, which means that
(exp(−aCt))t≥0 is an (Ft)t≥0-super-martingale. By the martingale convergence theorem, it
converges almost surely and – since the sum of rates is bounded away from 0 – the only possible
almost sure limit is 0. Now, 1. follows since Ct
t→∞−−−→ ∞ if and only if exp(−aCt) t→∞−−−→ 0
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for some a > 0. For 2., the process (exp(−aCt∧T1))t≥0 is a non-negative supermartingale by
Optional Stopping. Let us assume that T1 < ∞ almost surely, which occurs if and only if
Ct∧T1
t→∞−−−→ 1 almost surely. Then, using the Optional Stopping Theorem, we obtain with
C0 = 2
exp(−2a) = E[exp(−aC0)] ≥ lim
t→∞E[exp(−aCt∧T1)]
= E[ lim
t→∞ exp(−aCt∧T1)] = exp(−a),
a contradiction since a > 0. Thus, we have that P (T1 =∞) > 0.
6 Proofs
Here, we will show our main results.
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
For (i), we have α > γ. The assertion is a consequence of the coupling with the biased voter
model from Lemma 5.3 (with bias γ and α). Since the biased voter model dominates the
cVMBC and type 1 dies out in the biased voter model (5.2), the same is true for the cVMBC.
The proof of (ii) is more involved. We have to show that cooperators survive almost
surely when started in a non-trivial translation invariant configuration. Therefore, we analyze
an arbitrary cluster of cooperators and show that the size of such a cluster has a positive
probability to diverge off to infinity. Note that the flanking regions of a cluster of cooperators
can have three different forms:
Case A Case B Case C
001...1︸︷︷︸
cluster of cooperators
00, 101...1︸︷︷︸
cluster of cooperators
01, 001...1︸︷︷︸
cluster of cooperators
01 or 101...1︸︷︷︸00
These are the only possible environments a cluster of cooperators can encounter in one di-
mension. Note that a cluster can also only consist of a single cooperator. The dynamics of
the cluster size depends on the environment. Precisely, by the dynamics of the process, we
obtain the following. A cluster of size x > 1
in case A jumps to y = x+ 1 at rate 1 + γ
jumps to y = x− 1 at rate 1 + α
in case B jumps to y ≥ x+ 2 at rate at least 2 + γ
jumps to y = x− 1 at rate 1 + α+ γ
in case C jumps to y ≥ x+ 2 at rate at least 1 + γ2
jumps to y = x+ 1 at rate 1+γ2
jumps to y = x− 1 at rate 1 + α+ γ2 .
(6.1)
Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, let (Vt)t≥0 be a stochastic process representing the
cluster of cooperators which is closest to the origin and contains at least two cooperators. (If
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there is no such cluster at time 0, wait for some time ε > 0 and pick the cluster then.) We
will show that
P (Vt ↑ Z) > 0. (6.2)
For this, we compare |V | = (|Vt|)t≥0 with a jump process (V˜t)t≥0 as in Corollary ??, where
the jump rates at times t are given as follows:
in case A λ1(t) = 1 + γ, λ2(t) = 0, µ(t) = 1 + α;
in case B λ1(t) = 0, λ2(t) = 2 + γ, µ(t) = 1 + α+ γ;
in case C λ1(t) =
1 + γ
2
, λ2(t) = 1 +
γ
2
, µ(t) = 1 + α+
γ
2
.
Moreover, this process is stopped when reaching 1. By the comparison in (6.1), we see that
we can couple |V | and V˜ such that V˜ ≤ |V |, at least until V˜ reaches 1. Since the jump rates
of V˜ indeed satisfy 2λ2(t) + λ1(t) − µ(t) > ε > 0 for all times t ≥ 0 we find V˜t t→∞−−−→ ∞
with positive probability which implies that P (|Vt| t→∞−−−→∞) > 0 holds as well. Still, we need
to make sure that the cluster does not wander to ±∞. For this, consider both boundaries
of the cluster if it has grown to a large extent. The right boundary is again bounded from
below by a jump process of the form as in Corollary ?? with λ1(t) =
1+γ
2 , 0; λ2(t) = 0, 1 +
γ
2
and µ(t) = 1+α2 ,
1+α+γ
2 for the cases A and B (note that the right boundary alone of case C
is already captured by the right boundaries of the cases A and B). So, again, we see from
Corollary ?? that the right border of the cluster goes to infinity with positive probability.
The same holds for the left border of the cluster which tends to −∞. Therefore, we have
shown (6.2).
Now we use (6.2) to show that defectors indeed go extinct. Note that, from the argument
given above, the probability of survival of a cluster of cooperators depends on the environment,
but is bounded away from 0 by some p > 0. We start at time 0 with a cluster of cooperators
which has at least probability p to survive as proved above. In case it survives we are done,
otherwise it goes extinct in finite time and has at most merged with finitely many other
cooperating clusters until then. Thus, at this extinction time we can choose another cluster
of cooperators which exists due to the translation invariance of the starting configuration.
This cluster again has a probability of survival of at least p independently of the history of
the interacting particle system. This allows for a Borel-Cantelli-argument showing that when
repeating these steps arbitrarily often eventually one of the cooperating clusters survives.
This happens at the latest after a geometrically distributed number of attempts and thus in
finite time. Hence, we have P (limt→∞Xt(u) = 1) = 1 for all u and we are done.
For (iii), in order to prove clustering in the case α = γ > 0, there are actually two proofs.
One relies on the dual lattice and the study of process of cluster interfaces, which performs
annihilating random walks. This technique would even show clustering for all parameters α
and γ. However, we show clustering by studying the probability of finding a cluster edge in
the special case α = γ. Clustering for the other parameter configurations was already shown
in (i) and (ii) since extinction also implies clustering of the process.
For our method, we write pt(i0 · · · ik) := P (Xt(0) = i0, · · ·Xt(k) = ik) for i0, ..., ik ∈ {0, 1}
and k = 0, 1, 2, .... We have to show that
pt(10)
t→∞−−−→ 0, pt(01) t→∞−−−→ 0 (6.3)
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since then – by translation invariance – every configuration carrying both types has vanishing
probability for t→∞.
We start with the dynamics of pt(1), which reads (recall that α = γ)
∂pt(1)
∂t
=
1
2
(pt(10) + pt(01)) +
γ
2
(pt(110) + pt(011))
− 1 + α
2
(pt(10) + pt(01))− γpt(101)
= −α
2
(pt(10) + pt(01)) +
γ
2
(pt(10) + pt(01)− 2pt(010))− γpt(101)
= −γ(pt(101) + pt(010)) ≤ 0.
Since pt(1) ∈ [0, 1], this probability has to converge for t → ∞, hence ∂pt(1)∂t
t→∞−−−→ 0, and
therefore
pt(101)
t→∞−−−→ 0, pt(010) t→∞−−−→ 0. (6.4)
Now, consider the dynamics of pt(11), which is
∂pt(11)
∂t
= pt(101) +
γ
2
(pt(1101) + pt(1011))
− 1 + α
2
(pt(110) + pt(011))− γ
2
(pt(1011) + pt(1101))
= pt(101)− 1 + α
2
(pt(110) + pt(011)).
Since we know that pt(101)
t→∞−−−→ 0 by (6.4), and because pt(11) ∈ [0, 1], we also have that
pt(110)
t→∞−−−→ 0, pt(011) t→∞−−−→ 0.
We now conclude with
pt(10) = pt(010) + pt(110)
t→∞−−−→ 0,
pt(01) = pt(010) + pt(011)
t→∞−−−→ 0,
which shows (6.3).
6.2 Proof of Theorem 2
(i) We use the comparison with the biased voter model from Lemma 5.4. Therefore, we have
that α > γ(d − 1)/d if and only if α + γ/(2d) > γ(2d − 1)/(2d). Since for this choice of
parameters type 1 goes extinct in the biased voter model which dominates the aVMBC, we
are done.
(ii) For d = 1 and the nearest neighbor random walk, the altruistic mechanism is such that
a configuration 01 (or 10) turns into 00 at rate α/2 + γ/4. The same holds for the cVMBC
with selection rate α + γ/2. In addition, 110 (or 011) turns to 111 at rate γ/2, which is the
same as for the cVMBC with cooperation parameter γ. This shows that the transition rates
for the altruistic process X˜ satisfy:
If X˜(u) = 0, then
c(u, X˜) =
1
2
∑
v:|v−u|=1
X˜(v) +
γ
4
∑
v:|v−u|=1
X˜(v)
∑
w:|w−v|=1
w 6=u
X˜(w).
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If X˜(u) = 1, then
c(u, X˜) =
1 + α+ γ/2
2
∑
v:|v−u|=1
(1− X˜(v)) + γ
4
∑
v:|v−u|=1
(1− X˜(v))
∑
w:|w−v|=1
w 6=u
X˜(w).
These resemble the transition rates of a cVMBC with selection rate α + γ2 and cooperation
rate γ2 , see also equations (2.5) and (2.6). In particular, clustering in the case γ > α = 0
follows from Theorem 1 (iii).
6.3 Proof of Theorem 3
At time t, let Nt be the number of finite clusters in Xt with sizes C
1
t , ..., C
Nt
t . If the process
starts with finitely many defectors (cooperators), C1t , C
3
t , C
5
t , ... are sizes of clusters of defec-
tors (cooperators), and C2t , C
4
t , ... are sizes of clusters of cooperators (defectors). Note that
(Nt, C
1
t , ..., C
Nt
t )t≥0 is a Markov process. We will show the following:
1. Either, Nt
t→∞−−−→ 0 or Nt t→∞−−−→ 1.
2. In cases (ii) and (iii), Nt
t→∞−−−→ 0.
3. If Nt
t→∞−−−→ 1, then C1t t→∞−−−→∞.
Note that 1. and 3. together imply (i), i.e. X clusters in all cases. Of course, 2. implies (ii)
and (iii).
1. The process N = (Nt)t≥0 is non-increasing and bounded from below by 0, so conver-
gence of N is certain. We assume that N0 = n ≥ 3. Note that N0 is odd and remains so until
it hits 1 from where it may or may not jump to 0. In order to prove the claim we show that
the hitting time inf{s : Ns < n} is finite almost surely. For this, it suffices to show that
T := inf{s : Cks = 1 for some 1 ≤ k ≤ Ns} <∞ (6.5)
almost surely, since by time T , some cluster has size 1 and there is a positive chance that
N decreases at the next transition. If N does not decrease, there is the next chance after
another finite time and eventually, N will decrease.
If α ≥ γ, consider the size Ct of a cluster of cooperators. Before time T , all clusters have
size at least 2, so Ct jumps
from C to C + 1 at rate 1 + γ,
from C to C − 1 at rate 1 + α,
hence (Ct∧T )t≥0 is dominated by a symmetric random walk with jump rate 1+α, stopped when
hitting 1, which implies that T < ∞ almost surely due to the recurrence of the symmetric
random walk in one dimension. If γ ≥ α, the same argument shows that T <∞ if the role of
cooperators and defectors is exchanged. Hence we have proved (6.5) and 1. is shown.
2. If Nt
t→∞−−−→ 1 and α ≥ γ, the remaining finite cluster must consist of defectors (since
the argument used in 1. shows that a finite cluster of cooperators would die out). Therefore,
in case (ii), we must have that Nt
t→∞−−−→ 0. If γ ≥ α, the remaining finite cluster consists of
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cooperators for the same reason. Hence, in (iii), we must have that Nt
t→∞−−−→ 0. Thus, we
have shown 2.
3. As just argued in 1. and 2. if Nt
t→∞−−−→ 1 the remaining finite cluster must contain the
stronger type, i.e. defectors for α > γ and cooperators for γ > α. The size of the remaining
finite cluster therefore is a biased random walk which goes to infinity on {Nt t→∞−−−→ 1} and
the result follows.
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